



We hear sounds, and their sources, and their audible qualities. Sounds and
their sources are essentially dynamic entities, not wholly present at any given
moment, but unfolding through their temporal interval. Sounds and their
sources, essentially dynamic entities, are the bearers or susbtrata of audible
qualities. Audible qualities are qualities essentially sustained by activity. The
only bearers of audible qualities present in auditory experience are essentially
dynamic entities. Bodies are not, in this sense, essentially dynamic entities
and so are not present in our auditory experience. Though absent in auditory
experience, wemay, nonetheless, attend to bodies in audition, when an audible
sound-generating event in which they participate presents a dynamic aural
image of them.
Suppose that the bearers of audible qualities, such as pitch and timbre, are es-
sentially dynamic entities such as events or processes, not wholly present at any
moment, but unfolding through time. If we suppose further that only audible qual-
ities and their bearers are present in auditory experience then a puzzle arises. For
we seem to be able to attend to bodies in audition. We can listen to an animal’s
approach, say. But bodies are not essentially dynamic entities, nor do they inhere
in such. But only audible qualities and their bearers are present in auditory ex-
perience. Which means that bodies, being neither, are absent. But if bodies are
absent in auditory experience how may we attend to them in audition?
I believe that this puzzle may be resolved without rejecting the central claim
upon which it rests, that the bearers of audible qualities are essentially dynamic
entities. In the ﬁrst part of this talk, I try to motivate that claim. I do so both
directly and indirectly by criticizing an alternative. I end with a speculative reso-
lution of our puzzle.
What are the bearers of audible qualities? What are the kinds of things in which
such qualities inhere? I claim that the bearers of audible qualities are essentially
dynamic entities such as events, as opposed to bodies. If the bearers of audible
qualities are essentially dynamic entities, then audible qualities are qualities essen-
tially sustained by activity.
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Consider the following analogy: Colors are spatially extended, at least in the
sense of being instanced only by spatially extended things. We can imagine smaller
and smaller things being colored, but we cannot conceive of a thing without ex-
tension exhibiting color. Audible qualities are temporally extended, at least in
the sense of being instanced only by temporally extended things. We can imagine
hearing briefer and briefer occurrences of pitch, but we cannot conceive of a thing
without duration exhibiting pitch. The temporal dimension of the bearers of au-
dible qualities is not exhausted by their having a beginning and end, sounds have a
distinctive way of being in time. Like events, at least as the three-dimensionalist
conceives of them, sounds unfold in time. Unlike states that are wholly present
whenever they obtain, sounds are not wholly present at every moment of their
sounding. They are spread over the interval of time through which they unfold.
We hear sounds, and their sources, but we also hear their audible qualities. Audi-
ble qualities, such as pitch, are not essentially dynamic entities unfolding through
time. Rather, their mode of being is more akin to themode of being of states. Nev-
ertheless, sounds and their sources, conceived as essentially dynamic entities, not
wholly present at any moment, but unfolding through time, are bearers of audible
qualities. That the bearer of an audible quality is an essentially dynamic entity is
manifest in the conditions under which that quality may be instantiated. There
is no instantaneous pitch since there is nothing instantaneous to instantiate it.
For pitch to exist, it must persist over time. And that is because audible qualities
are qualities essentially sustained by activity. The audible qualities of a sound will
vary and extinguish as the sound’s activity varies and extinguishes. Sounds with-
out audible qualities would be inaudible, but audible qualities without sound would
simply not be (or at least, those audible qualities that modify sounds, as opposed
to other audible substrata, such as sources). Audible qualities, while not essentially
dynamic entities, are qualities that audible activity gives rise to. They are qualities
of audible events or processes or phases of these.
Kulvicki (2008) has argued that the bearers of audible qualities are not events but
bodies. Like Aristotle, De anima 2 11 422b31–32, he accepts that an audible quality
has a bearer. Being quality instances, they must inhere in something upon which
they existentially and ontologically depend. However, unlike Aristotle, he denies
that sound is the bearer of audible qualities. Audible qualities inhere in bodies
but these bodies are not themselves sounds. Rather, they are ordinary material
substances. Instead, sounds are the audible qualities that inhere in these bodies
and are manifest in their audible activity. Thus, like Pasnau (1999) and Leddington
(2014), Kulivicki endorses a broadly Lockean metaphysics that identiﬁes sounds
with audible qualities. However, it is not the Lockean metaphysics of sound that
is our present focus, but whether bodies are bearers of audible qualities.
Bodies have resonant modes determined by their material structure. Because of
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their resonant modes, bodies are disposed to vibrate at certain natural frequencies
when “thwacked”. According to Kulvicki, the sound a body has, an audible qual-
ity of it, is the stable disposition to vibrate when thwacked. Just as the energy of
the illuminant reveals the colors of things to sight, the energy of thwacking reveals
the sounds of things to hearing. And just as bodies retain their colors even when
unilluminated, bodies retain their sound even when unthwacked. The stable dis-
position to vibrate when thwacked is a sound that a body has. Not every sound
that a thing makes is a sound that a thing has. Stereo speakers when thwacked
produce a dull thud, but when played they can make a wide variety of sounds.
Why think that sounds are qualities of material bodies that are associated with
their natural frequencies? Kulvicki provides an argument from perceptual con-
stancy that, while not conclusive, is meant to speak strongly in favor of his view.
Kulvicki draws our attention to an interesting feature of speech perception, out
ability to recognize voices. A speaker’s voice will vary in pitch, timbre, and so on,
as they speak. And yet despite these variable auditory appearances, we seem to be
presented with a constant voice in our experience of their speech. This is due, in
part, to the resonant modes of the special parts of the speaker involved in speech
production, such as their vocal cords and nasal cavities. And this is just the kind
of auditory constancy one would expect if the sounds that we hear were stable
dispositions of objects to vibrate when thwacked.
We have our voices. At least as we ordinarily speak. But do we have them, as
well, in Kulvicki’s extraordinary sense? Or are they sounds that we make but do
not have? The sound of a stereo speaker playing is a sound that it makes but does
not have. I suspect that a person’s voice is more like the sound of a stereo speaker
playing than the sound that it makes when thwacked. Through a series of unfor-
tunate events, I have ﬁrst hand experience of what I sound like when thwacked. I
can attest it sounds nothing like my voice. Like a stereo speaker, I produce a dull
thud when thwacked. When playing, a stereo speaker produces the sounds that
it makes but does not have by an internal activity driving the vibration of special
parts of it. When speaking, I produce the sounds that I do by an internal activity
driving the vibration of special parts of myself. Are these not sounds that I make
but do not have? If the sound of my voice is something that I make but do not
have, then its being the constant element in an auditory experience provides no
reason for thinking that sounds are stable dispositions to vibrate when thwacked
since these are sounds that bodies were meant to have rather than make.
Kulvicki is right to emphasize that auditory experience can disclose the stable
dispositions of bodies to vibrate at their natural frequencies and so auditorily man-
ifest, albeit partially and imperfectly, material properties of those bodies. But in
hearing that, is what we hear a sound or its source? Suppose that we hear sounds
and their sources. And suppose that the sources that we hear are sound-generating
3
events. A body’s participation, if not the body itself, is part of the audible structure
of that event. And those aspects of the body relevant to its participation in the
event are reﬂected, partially and imperfectly, in its audible structure. Stable dispo-
sitions of bodies to vibrate at their natural frequencies given their resonant modes
as determined by their material structure are aspects of bodies relevant to their
participation in audible activities, such as being thwacked. WhenDr Johnson, out-
side of the church in Harwich, kicked the stone, his boot rebounding despite its
mighty force, the stone was well and truly thwacked. Doubtless, it could be heard
as well as felt. And Dr Johnston could hear, as well as feel, that it was a stone, and
not a log, that he was kicking. He could hear his boot kicking a stone as opposed
to a log because of their distinctive timbre. Their different resonant modes are
relevant to their participation in audible activities such as being kicked. Kulvicki
is right to emphasize that auditory experience can disclose the stable dispositions
of bodies to vibrate at their natural frequencies and so auditorily manifest, albeit
partially and imperfectly, material properties of these bodies. But he was wrong
to suggest that this requires bodies to be the bearers of audible qualities.
We hear sounds and their sources. These are essentially dynamic entities, not
wholly present at any given moment, but unfolding through time, or so I claim.
Sounds and their sources have audible qualities, qualities essentially sustained by
activity. Are sounds and their sources, as well as their audible qualities, really all
that we can hear?
According to Broad (1952, 4), we ordinarily speak of hearing bodies. So when
Big Ben strikes the time, and is in earshot, we may say that we can hear Big Ben.
However, Broad concedes little in acknowledging this point of usage since he also
observes that it takes but a little pressure to convince “the plainest of plain men”
that “hearing Big Ben” is shorthand for hearing the striking of Big Ben. If we ac-
cept Broad’s suggestion, then we only hear Big Ben insofar as it is a participant
in a sound-generating event or process. And when we do, what we strictly speak-
ing hear is Big Ben’s striking and not Big Ben, that is, not the body, but an event
the body participates in. We hear not the body in a condition of activity, but the
activity of the body.
Allow me to engage in speculation about a hypothetical sense in which we may
be said to hear bodies consistent with the principle, if true, that audition only
presents bearers of audible qualities with the distinctive temporal mode of being
of events or processes.
Both sounds and the sources that we hear are like events in that they are not
wholly present at every moment of their occurrence. Perhaps this is a general fea-
ture of the bearers of audible qualities present in audition. Perhaps for a bearer
of an audible quality to be present in auditory experience it must have a particular
temporal mode of being, it must unfold through time. This would preclude, by
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their very nature, entities such as bodies from being present in auditory experi-
ence. First, by hypothesis, bodies lack the requisite temporal mode of being of
bearers of audible qualities. And second, bodies do not inhere in essentially dy-
namic entities the way that audible qualities do. But if what is present in auditory
experience is either essentially dynamic or an audible quality that the essentially
dynamic substratum gives rise to, then bodies are not present in auditory experi-
ence. Earlier we noted Broad’s helpful suggestion that perhaps “hearing Big Ben”
is elliptical for hearing Big Ben’s striking.
As plausible as this may be, a worry may still persist. One of the uses to which
audition may be put is to track a body’s progress through the natural environment.
We can listen to an animal’s approach, say. And it might be thought that we are
attending to the animal in audition in listening to them. Moreover, it might seem
insufficient for the body to be attended to that an event in which that body par-
ticipates is present in auditory experience. Not every part of a visible body is seen,
so why assume that every participant of an audible event is heard? How can we lis-
ten out for bodies even though they are precluded from being present in auditory
experience?
Bodies may not be present in auditory experience, but perhaps they ﬁgure in
auditory experience in another way, if not as the intentional object of experience,
then something very much like it. Bodies are, on the speculative hypothesis that
we are entertaining, not present in auditory experience. Thus bodies are absent in
auditory experience. And yet we can attend to bodies in audition. How could this
be?
Aristotle uses this kind of puzzle or aporia about presence in absence to argue
for, as we might put it, the intentional character of memory (De memoria et remi-
niscentia 450a25–451a1, for discussion see Sorabji 2004). The Peripatetic response
to the puzzle is to straightforwardly accept the claim of absence and reinterpret
what purported to be a presentation instead as a kind of re-presentation. When
one remembers Corsicus in his absence one contemplates a phantasma caused by
a previous perception of Corsicus and one conceives of the phantasma as a like-
ness and reminder of Corsicus as he was perceived. How might the Peripatetic
response, so abstractly described, be applied to the perceptual case of attending
to bodies in audition?
Perhaps what is present in auditory experience may constitute a natural image
of what is absent. That is, perhaps we can understand hearing the body’s sound-
generating activity as providing the listener with a dynamic aural image of the body
otherwise absent in audition. It is an image, indeed, as I have suggested, a natural
image, like a fossil or a footprint. But unlike paradigmatic images it is not a visual
image but an aural image. And while visual images are static, aural images, if such
there be, would be dynamic as beﬁtting their aural character. Hearing Big Ben’s
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striking, while not the presentation of Big Ben in auditory experience, would nev-
ertheless provide the listener with a dynamic aural image of Big Ben. We do not
so much as hear Big Ben in a condition of activity as we hear Big Ben in its audible
activity. In order for this to be so, the auditory presentation of a sound-generating
event must involve at least the partial disclosure of the event’s participants. Audi-
tion partially discloses an event’s participant by presenting it’s participation in the
audible event. It is the body’s participation in the event, and not the body per se,
that is part of the event’s audible structure. The disclosure of such audible struc-
ture is partial. Only those aspects of the body that are manifest in its participation
in the audible event are disclosed, and perhaps only some of those. Furthermore,
there is no guarantee that if a perceiver hears an event, they hear each of its par-
ticipants, if any. But that is consistent with audition, in certain circumstances of
perception, partially disclosing at least some of the participants in the unfolding
audible event. It is only if we can hear Big Ben’s participation in its striking that
we can use that hearing to attend to Big Ben. It is only if we can hear Big Ben’s
participation, can that hearing provide us with a dynamic aural image of Big Ben
and its activities that we exploit in attending to Big Ben in audition.
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